Before I read the Executive Summary of the CIA's Inspector General on CIA Accountability, I thought that DCI Hayden's statement on its release sounded awfully defensive. The Accountability Review Team, was charged with determining whether, based on their performance before 9/11, any agency employees were deserving of awards or warranted being held responsible for failing to perform their responsibilities. Having read the summary, I now appreciate why General Hayden didn't want it released.

Naturally, multiple awards have been bestowed, including George Tenet's Presidential Medal of Freedom. No one has been disciplined for failing to act "in accordance with a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence," as required by agency regulation.

The review team's analysis, which concludes that a review board should assess the apparent performance failings of some employees, seems temperate and fair. They appear to have avoided 20/20 hindsight and disagree with some previous fault-finding given instances when employees, for example, faced a "difficult operating environment and limited cooperation the the part of [redacted]." Even with a fair number of "[redacteds]," the summary is eye-opening. It is very tough on Tenet who utterly failed to follow through on his December 1998 "We are at war" pronouncement about the terrorist threat — no comprehensive strategic plan, no new resources, no additional personnel, no leadership on crippling inter-agency disputes. A National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the U.S. was produced in 1995 and updated in 1997. An updated version was finally being edited on 9/11.

As General Hayden points out, the summary finds "no single point of failure" that would have prevented the 9/11 attacks, but the recounting of the CIA's inexcusable failure to report to the FBI that two known al Qaeda associates (who were 9/11 hijackers) had traveled to the U.S. comes awfully close. The summary concludes: "Informing the FBI and good operational followthrough by CIA and FBI might have resulted in surveillance of [the "UBL associates"]. Surveillance, in turn, would have had the potential to yield information on flight training, financing, and links to others who were complicit in the 9/11 attacks." The review team recommends assessing the performance of two chiefs of the counterterrorism unit with respect to their management of the watchlist program and of three managers for failure to ensure prompt action on the known al Qaeda members in the U.S.

General Hayden objects to the creation of any Accountability Board to consider disciplinary actions. He insists his refusal "is NOT about avoiding responsibility." But that's exactly what it looks like.